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Abstract
Background: Mathematical modelling of infectious diseases is a powerful tool for the design of management
policies and a fundamental part of the arsenal currently deployed to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Methods: We present a compartmental model for the disease where symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals
move separately. We introduced healthcare burden parameters allowing to infer possible containment and
suppression strategies. In addition, the model was scaled up to describe different interconnected areas, giving the
possibility to trigger regionalized measures. It was specially adjusted to Mendoza-Argentina’s parameters, but is
easily adaptable for elsewhere.
Results: Overall, the simulations we carried out were notably more effective when mitigation measures were not
relaxed in between the suppressive actions. Since asymptomatics or very mildly affected patients are the vast
majority, we studied the impact of detecting and isolating them. The removal of asymptomatics from the infectious
pool remarkably lowered the effective reproduction number, healthcare burden and overall fatality. Furthermore,
different suppression triggers regarding ICU occupancy were attempted. The best scenario was found to be the
combination of ICU occupancy triggers (on: 50%, off: 30%) with the detection and isolation of asymptomatic
individuals. In the ideal assumption that 45% of the asymptomatics could be detected and isolated, there would be
no need for complete lockdown, and Mendoza’s healthcare system would not collapse.
Conclusions: Our model and its analysis inform that the detection and isolation of all infected individuals, without
leaving aside the asymptomatic group is the key to surpass this pandemic.
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Background
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought the world to a
pause with the sole aim to defeat this worldwide threat,
and the scientific community has joined the effort. Since
its outbreak by the end of 2019, we have been able to learn
some about this new SARS-Cov2 coronavirus. Unfortu-
nately, new facts come with a lag compared to the virus
spread and governments are forced to make prompt
decisions based on limited evidence which changes at a
staggering pace. The fight against a practically unknown
enemy has been and still is the major obstacle. Aside from
studying the virus’s biology, infecting mechanisms, prob-
able treatments and of course vaccine development,
epidemic mathematical modelling has stepped forward.
In a trade-off between simplicity and detail, compart-
mental modelling strategies provide a sharp suit that
allows exploring a variety of scenarios and provides an
intuitive understanding of the most critical factors
governing disease dynamics. The recent use of Suscepti-
ble(S)- Exposed(E)- Infected(I)- Recovered(R) models
has made a difference for public health care decision
making by providing, for example, estimations of the im-
pact of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPI) [1, 2].
The main challenge is to create a model that predicts
plausible scenarios for a disease we have known for only
a few months.
One of the most important barriers for the provision
of solid epidemiological parameters has been the differ-
ent management strategies that each country has taken
in response to this outbreak. Most evidently, the Case
fatality Rate (CFR) varies largely between countries (i.e.
Italy 12%, Argentina 3%, Iceland 0.3%). Varying CFRs
cannot be explained only by the different population age
structure or available critical care beds. Most importantly,
uneven and time-varying testing criteria in different coun-
tries make the CFR an inadequate severity parameter.
South Korea and especially and more recently, Iceland’s
approach to testing massively for COVID-19 has brought
us closer to the real Infection Fatality Rate (IFR) which de-
scribes more precisely the magnitude of the threat [3–5].
Better estimates of the IFR have given insights on two as-
pects. Firstly, the asymptomatic or very mildly symptom-
atic group of individuals is more significant than previously
thought [6, 7] since they represent the vast majority of the
infected individuals [4, 5, 8]. Secondly, these individuals, in
most cases, are not detected nor isolated, and therefore ap-
pear to be the leading cause of the epidemic’s spread.
We proposed ourselves to model the strike of the virus
locally (Mendoza-Argentina). Anyhow, our model applies
to any city or country and available for use and adaptation.
Argentina, as a developing country, was not going to be
able to bear this pandemic without a health care collapse.
Based on the epidemic behaviour in Europe, the govern-
ment determined a complete lockdown as the primary
measure of control for the country as from March 20th,
when Argentina’s confirmed positive cases were only 128,
mainly located in the capital city Buenos Aires and mostly
imported. Many regions from inside Argentina had zero
confirmed cases, including the authors’ hometown,
Mendoza province. Prompt lockdown measures signifi-
cantly flattened the curve at an early stage. Arguably this
was an anticipated measure, and it gave time to prepare
(at least to some extent) for what was/is coming.
As mentioned by Ferguson et al. [9], the efficiency of
mitigation and suppression measures depends on the
size of the country or region in which these actions are
implemented. Different population densities, uneven
access to intensive health care, distinguishing age-related
communities, all make the epidemic spread distinctively.
Therefore, a model should be able to take these variables
into account.
We propose here an SEIR model for COVID-19 epi-
demics that incorporates specific compartments that
classify infected individuals in several clinical categories.
These compartments provide figures that can inform the
strategic planning of health care requirements. On the
other hand, different regions exchange infectious and
exposed individuals through communication routes.
Consequently, the model can provide the possibility to
trigger measures independently for each city and block
intercommunications selectively. Most importantly, we
model asymptomatic or very mildly affected individuals
as a subset of the infectious compartment. We demon-
strate here the significant impact that detecting and iso-
lating these individuals can have on the disease
outcome.
Methods
We augmented the basic SEIR scheme by modelling
symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals separately.
Symptomatic individuals can move into mild and severe
cases which can recover or further evolve into critical
care and recover or die. Asymptomatic individuals may
move into an isolated compartment after a detection lag
of variable efficiency. Figure 1 shows a connection
diagram of the compartments in our model and Table 1
provides a detailed description of each. Figure 2 shows
the possible timelines of the evolution of an initially sus-
ceptible individual together with the relevant parameters
that determine the flow between compartments. Table 1
provides a detailed description of each compartment.
Based on recent calculations on the IFR, of 0.39–1.33%
[3], and most recently of 0.01–0.19% inferred from Ice-
land’s statistics [4, 5], we adapted the parameters for our
model to our country. Taking in consideration an IFR of
~ 0.3% and the current CFR in Argentina of ~ 3% we
concluded that 90% of the infected cases were asymp-
tomatic or with very mild symptoms not fulfilling the
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current Argentine criteria for COVID-19 testing (fever
& sore throat or cough or respiratory distress). The
asymptomatic case percentage is in line with the published
data by Li et al. [8] who estimated the undocumented
cases in 86%.
Argentina’s principle to test only highly suspicious cases
is leaving out asymptomatic and paucisymptomatic indi-
viduals. For our model, we used the complete epidemio-
logical data we found [3, 9] that referred to a subset of
patients from China for which a similar criterion for
COVID-19 testing and hospitalization than Argentina was
used. We adapted it to maintain the CFR of ~ 3% and IFR
~ 0.3%. Summarizing, from what is called “symptomatic
cases” in Argentina today, around 10% will require
hospital care, of those, 36% will need intensive care unit
facilities, and of the latter, 50% will die.
Based on European case growth rates, and in agree-
ment with the parameters we set for our model, we
presumed a basic reproduction number of 4 [2]. We
assumed that mitigation measures (case-isolation, gen-
eral social distancing, banning of public gatherings, uni-
versity closures) lower R0 to 2 and suppression measures
(complete lockdown or quarantine of the whole popula-
tion except for essential activities) could make R0 ≤ 1 [2].
We supposed, as published, that asymptomatic individ-
uals are half as infective as symptomatic patients [8, 9].
We inferred for these an attenuation factor of 0.5 in the
basic reproduction number and one third to one half the
infective time of symptomatic cases [9, 10]. Table 2
shows the parameters we chose and the bibliography
that supports our choices.
The SEIR model depicted in Fig. 1 gives rise to the
following set of ordinary differential equations:
Ṡ ¼ − βISS − β0 IAS
Ė ¼ βISS þ β0 IAS − μE














































Fig. 1 Compartments and connections in the modified SEIR model we propose







RA Recovered from asymptomatic cases
M Mild
H Hospitalized
HICU In critical care
RS Recovered from symptomatic cases
F Deceased
* Table 1. Compartments of the SEIR model
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Fig. 2 Possible timelines for an initially susceptible individual. Over the arrows connecting each compartment we show the relevant mean
residence times and branching probabilities. The time and probabilities we used for the analysis are stated according to the literature in Table 2
Table 2 The model’s parameters
Parameter Meaning value References
R0 Basic reproduction number 4 Flaxman et al. .2020 [2]
Dinc Incubation period (days) 5 Flaxman et al. .2020 [2]
Dinf Time for which a symptomatic individual is infectious (days) 4 Li et al. 2020 [8]
Drec Time to recover for M and H cases that do not require ICU (days) 14 Fang et al. 2020 [11]
DrecA Time to recover (negativize PCR) for an IA (days) 7 Zhang et al. 2020 [10, 12]
Dlag Time for H to require ICU (days) 7 [6]
DrecICU Time for HICU to recover in ICU (days) 14 Fang et al. 2020 [11]
pA Probability of an infected patient to be asymptomatic 0.9 Li et al. 2020 [8]
pH Probability of a symptomatic individual to require hospitalization 0.1 Verity et al. 2020, Ferguson et al. 2020 [3, 9]
pICU Probability of H to require ICU 0.36 Verity et.al 2020, Ferguson et al. 2020 [3, 9]
pF Probability of HICU to die 0.5 Ferguson et al. 2020 [9]
fA Attenuation factor for asymptomatic patients 0.5 Li et al. 2020 [8]
* Table 2: Parameters used for our SEIR model, their value and the bibliography that supports them
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Where dotted quantities are time derivatives and β
¼ R0ð 1Dinf Þ , β
0 ¼ f AR0ð 1Dinf Þ , μ ¼ ð 1DincÞ and γ ¼ ð 1Df inf gÞ .
Probabilistic parameters are adjusted to provide a CFR
and IFR of 3 and 0.3% respectively in equilibrium. The
quantity pAI represents the probability that an asymp-
tomatic individual is detected and isolated. The mean
residence time parameters govern the dynamical evolu-
tion of the compartment populations. The model is
scaled up to describe different interconnected areas or
cities by integrating the ordinary differential equation
set for periods of a day and exchanging exposed and
infectious individuals at the end of each day according
to the following equation:
Xl ¼
Xk Jk;l þ Xl Nl − J k;l
 
Nl
Where Xl and Xk stand for the fraction of exposed and
infectious individuals in regions l and k respectively, Nl
is the population of area l and Jkl is the number of
people exchanged daily between areas l and k. Infectious
individuals include both asymptomatic and symptomatic
ones.
We divided the Mendoza province into 4 regions:
North (mostly urban), West (vineyard and mountain
zone), East (primarily rural) and South (urban and rural).
Hospital beds and ICU (intensive care units) for each
area were added to the model. Additionally, an estimate
of how many people travel daily between the regions
was considered (Fig.3).
Results
Use of the regional compartmentalization of the model
We set our model to run in 4 zones of the Mendoza
province considering their respective population, daily
mobilization of people between the regions, and health
care facilities for each area (Fig. 3). As an example of the
application of this tool, we simulated an outbreak in the
Fig. 3 Mendoza province, located in the Center-West of Argentina (shown in red in the Argentina map). We present the four zones in which we
compartmentalized the model detailing hospital beds/1000 inhabitants and daily mean people exchange between regions (a, b, c). Mendoza’s
map was made by the authors using Corel Draw 2019 demo version, Argentina’s map was taken from Wikimedia commonshttps://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Provincia_de_Mendoza,_Argentina.png
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North zone, starting with one infected person and moni-
tored its arrival to the West area. We contemplated two
different reproduction numbers; R0 = 4 (no mitigation
nor suppression actions installed) or R0 = 2 (moderate
containment measures governing the whole province).
Around 10,400 people travel every day between these
districts. Without interfering in the communication
routes between zones, it took 29 days (R0 = 4) and 88
days (R0 = 2) for the virus to spread to the West zone.
When travelling between the communities was reduced
to a tenth, the outbreak reached the West with a 17-day
lag (day 46) in the R0 = 4 scenario and a 42-day delay
(day 130) for the R0 = 2 scenario (Fig.4). As expected,
this shows that blocking communication routes between
districts is an excellent strategy to delay the entrance of
the epidemic. Anyhow, this action has more power when
combined with other containment measures as shown
here by comparing a R0 = 4 versus an R0 = 2 situation.
Furthermore, in this restricted communication situation,
the exponential curves eventually catch up if no other
interventions are instated (data not shown in graph).
The communication restriction between North and
West practically does not modify the North’s dynamic,
so in Fig.4, we only show the basal state of the Northern
District.
The importance of the asymptomatic group in the model
Considering that the asymptomatic or very mildly affected
individuals are the majority, as can be expected, to detect
and isolate them diminishes the total infectious popula-
tion and changes the epidemic evolution dynamics. As Li
et al. have shown [8] the introduction of an asymptomatic
reservoir with a different reproduction number modifies
the epidemic evolution in a non-trivial manner. This effect
comes into place by a modification of the effective
reproduction number (Re) when asymptomatic individuals
are considered. Elaborating on this result, we can add that
fast and efficient detection plus the isolation of asymptom-
atic individuals can indeed control the epidemic. The ef-
fective reproduction number of the model shown in Fig. 1
is significantly altered by fast and efficient detection plus
isolation of asymptomatic individuals, as shown in Fig. 5a.
If the efficiency of detection is 50% within 3 days of be-
coming infectious, the effective reproduction number can
be reduced by a half. If this policy is accompanied by other
non-pharmaceutical interventions that lower the basic
reproduction number such as mitigation and suppression
measures then the effective reproduction number can be
brought to values lower than one, effectively controlling
the epidemic. On the opposite extreme, the effective
reproduction number is larger than the R0 parameter
when asymptomatics are not isolated and therefore
remain infectious until recovery. For details on the calcu-
lation of the Re please refer to the supplementary online
resource material (ESM _1).
As can be expected from its influence on the effective
reproduction number, the isolation of asymptomatic indi-
viduals has a dramatic effect on the duplication time of the
epidemic in the exponential growth phase (Fig. 5b). In a
basic reproduction number scenario of 2, isolating half of
the asymptomatic individuals within 4 days of becoming in-
fectious can effectively double the time it takes for clinical
cases to duplicate in the exponential growth phase. This ef-
fect is smaller for more significant reproduction numbers
reinforcing the statement that other interventions must
accompany this policy in order to control the epidemic.
Fig. 4 The impact of district intercommunication restriction on the infection spread. We show the infection rate of an outbreak initiated in the
Northern District and how it spreads to the West zone with and without a 90% intercommunication restriction policy. Curves for two R0 scenarios
are plotted (R0 = 4 and R0 = 2). The communication restriction between North and West practically does not modify the North’s dynamic, so we
only show the basal state of the Northern District. Figure confectioned using Graph Pad Prism 5
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The consequence on the effective reproduction number
of the removal of asymptomatic individuals from the infec-
tious pool affects both epidemic dynamics and equilibrium
values. The result is robust over a wide range of parameters.
Figure 6 shows the effect of efficient asymptomatic isolation
on health capacity burden and overall mortality for the
whole population. The plots show medians and interquar-
tile ranges over a sample of 10,000 sets of parameters. This
set was built by sampling residence times from truncated
normal distributions between 0 and twice the average value
shown in Table 2 with a standard deviation of 50% the
average value. We assumed the detection and isolation of
50% of asymptomatic individuals in day 3.
Efficient removal of asymptomatic infectious indi-
viduals from circulation has dramatic effects on
healthcare burden and fatality over the total popula-
tion, mainly when R0 remains at the lower end. Once
more, this supports the importance to maintain other
mitigation actions in combination with asymptomatic
detection and isolation.
Suppression triggers
Considering the hospital beds and ICU facilities for each
zone, we ventured to see if a zone-specific on-off suppression
measure policy was feasible, as suggested by Ferguson et al.
[9]. Considering the results shown in Fig. 4, the
Fig. 5 Effect of the probability of isolation of asymptomatic infectious individuals (PAI) at different times (day of asymptomatic isolation: DA) on
the effective reproduction number (Re) (a) and on the duplication time of the number of cases during the exponential phase of the epidemic (b).
Figure confectioned using Graph Pad Prism 5
Fig. 6 Healthcare burden effect of detection and isolation of 50% of asymptomatic individuals within 3 days of becoming infectious. The plots
show medians and interquartile ranges over a sample of 10,000 sets of parameters of important healthcare variables: maximum usage of hospital
beds (ICU and non-ICU), and accumulated fatalities when system reaches equilibrium. Figure confectioned using Graph Pad Prism 5
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communication between all the districts was diminished to a
tenth as well. We set a trigger of 50% ICU occupancy (of
beds destined to be used for COVID-19, assuming ~ 70% of
total ICU beds were going to be intended to the epidemic) to
turn on suppression measures and a stopper of 30% of ICU
occupancy to relax these actions. We show results for an
R0 = 4 fluctuating with an Rt= 1 and an R0 = 2 combined
with an Rt= 1. Considering R0 = 4 as normal activities before
this pandemic and R0 = 2 with necessary containment mea-
sures but not complete lockdown. An Rt= 1 was considered
when complete lockdown or quarantine was ordered.
In the first scenario, the exponentiality of an R0 = 4
curve is impossible to stop, even when a complete lock-
down is set, and inevitably the sanitary system collapses
in all areas, making this undoubtedly a lousy strategy.
This evidence supports once more what we said in the
previous scheme; life cannot return to normal when sup-
pression measures are relaxed. (Fig. 7).
Considering that once the epidemic has struck, social
standards are entirely changed, we simulated an alterna-
tion of R0 and Rt between 2 and 1, meaning this that
once strict measures are relaxed, there are still essential
actions being taken (i.e. social distancing, universities re-
main closed, etc.). In Fig. 8 we show that the Northern
area can stand this situation without a sanitary collapse,
needing two quarantines to surpass the epidemic. The
other, more rural areas still have an overwhelmed health
care system and need much more time in maximum
isolation.
Since intensive health care facilities are mainly located
in the North, we set our model with the ICU beds as a
single pool for the whole province. We still maintained
the areas separated regarding the rest of the parameters.
Also, movement between cities remained restricted to a
tenth. Contemplating this, we ran once more the model
between R0 = 2 and an Rt = 1. This strategy kept the
health system below saturation and the quarantine pe-
riods were more acceptable for the whole territory. Still,
in this scenario, 4.5 months of lockdown are needed to
endure the pandemic and the inconvenience of having
to transfer patients throughout the territory yet needs to
be considered. (Fig. 9).
Since the asymptomatic group is such an essential part
of the system, we ventured to see what would happen if
one could detect and isolate at least a proportion of
them. Thus, using the same triggers as before (ICU beds
50–30%), in a synchronized system, we added the detec-
tion and isolation of different proportions of asymptom-
atic individuals. In Fig. 10 we see that screening for
asymptomatic cases diminishes significantly the time
needed with complete lockdown. In the ideal assumption
that 45% of the asymptomatics could be detected and
isolated, there would be no need for quarantine, and the
health care system would not collapse.
Discussion
Argentina was one of the countries that acted fastest
and most rigorously very early in the arrival of the
Fig. 7 The effect of triggered on-off suppression measures in each region (trigger = 50% ICU occupancy, stopper = 30% ICU occupancy) in a R0 =
4 scenario. Dotted lines represent reproduction number fluctuance between R0 = 4 (no containment measures installed) and Rt = 1 (lockdown).
Full lines show % of ICU occupied beds throughout the timeline of 1000 days for which these on-off measures were simulated. Figure
confectioned using Graph Pad Prism 5
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pandemic, setting a complete lockdown when only 128
cases had been reported. This policy has indeed “flat-
tened the curve” as it has in many countries around the
world for which the growth of clinical cases has changed
from exponential to linear in time. The sustainment of
drastic suppression measures over months, albeit possibly
successful, is not sustainable and alternatives must be
considered.
To establish a reliable mathematical model for a prac-
tically unknown disease was a challenge and it was an
important knowledge gap [13], but we had the advantage
to count with previous epidemiological studies [3, 11,
14, 15] and modelling proposals [7–9]. We established a
locally inspired mathematical model of the disease, in
the ~ 1,900,000 population province of Mendoza-
Argentina, which can apply to any other city or country.
Fig. 8 The effect of triggered on-off suppression measures in each region (trigger = 50% ICU occupancy, stopper = 30% ICU occupancy) in a R0 =
2 scenario. Dotted lines represent reproduction number fluctuance between R0 = 2 (moderate containment measures installed) and Rt = 1
(lockdown). Full lines represent % of ICU occupied beds throughout the timeline for which these on-off measures were simulated. Figure
confectioned using Graph Pad Prism 5
Fig. 9 The effect of triggered on-off suppression measures in the whole territory (trigger = 50% ICU occupancy, stopper = 30% ICU occupancy) in
a R0 = 2 scenario. ICU beds were considered as a single pool for the entire province. Dotted lines represent reproduction number fluctuance
between R0 = 2 (moderate containment measures installed) and Rt = 1 (lockdown). Full lines represent % of ICU occupied beds throughout the
timeline for which these on-off measures were simulated. Figure confectioned using Graph Pad Prism 5
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The model we propose provides explicit variables such
as the number of patients under intensive care, hospital
admissions, mild cases, and asymptomatic individuals.
These variables are described dynamically according to
the different residence times in each compartment and
branching probabilities. We consider this to be a super-
ior alternative to evaluating health burden parameters
from a purely probabilistic point of view that does not
consider the dynamical nature of the epidemic evolution.
Furthermore, our model is adapted to the regional real-
ities of small districts, which can be used as a strategy
tool for any place in the world.
We confirmed that if an outbreak were to burst in one
city, blocking circulating routes can as expected, have an
essential impact. On the other hand, the health care dis-
tribution of Mendoza made a regionalized trigger for
suppression impractical because of the uneven assign-
ment of intensive care units. Still, in other countries or
regions, this strategy might be useful.
The significant contribution we can make is to suggest
that asymptomatic or very mildly ill patients provide a
primordial hinge to manage the epidemic. Any control
upon them exerts a substantial impact on the disease
outcome. Previously described on-off suppression strat-
egies [9] become much more effective when combined
with the detection and isolation of asymptomatic cases.
The association of mitigation measures with detection
and isolation of around half of the asymptomatic and
paucisymptomatic individuals would not need strict sup-
pressive actions. Therefore, massive COVID-19 screen-
ing would be an alternative to the province’s complete
lockdown.
For low-income countries, like ours, screening by
pool-testing could be a helpful strategy if started early in
the epidemic. Yelin et al. [16] showed that samples could
be examined adequately in pools of 32, reducing dramat-
ically the costs needed for extensive screening. Argentina
could use this strategy to detect and isolate as many
asymptomatic or very mildly affected individuals as pos-
sible to be able to reduce the time span over which strict
suppression measures are in effect.
Conclusions
Our model and its analysis inform that the detection
and isolation of all infected individuals, without leaving
aside the asymptomatic and very mildly affected group is
key to surpass this pandemic.
Supplementary Information




NPI: Non-pharmaceutical interventions; CFR: Case fatality rate; IFR: Infection
fatality rate; S: Susceptible; E: Exposed; I: Infected; R: Recovered; IA: Infected
Fig. 10 The effect of detecting and isolating different percentages of asymptomatic individuals on a model triggering on-off suppression
measures in the whole territory (trigger = 50% ICU occupancy, stopper = 30% ICU occupancy) in a R0 = 2 scenario. ICU beds were considered as a
single pool for the entire province. Dotted lines represent reproduction number fluctuance between R0 = 2 (moderate containment measures
installed) and Rt = 1 (lockdown). Full lines represent % of ICU occupied beds throughout the timeline for which these on-off measures were
simulated. Figure confectioned using Graph Pad Prism 5
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asymptomatic; IS: Infected symptomatic; IA
isol: Isolated asymptomatic;
RA: Recovered from asymptomatic cases; M: Mild; H: Hospitalized; HICU: In
critical care; RS: Recovered from symptomatic cases; F: Deceased; R0: Basic
reproduction number; Rt: Reproduction number at a specific time;
Re: Effective reproduction number; ICU: Intensive-care unit; Dinc: incubation
period (days); Dinf: Time for which a symptomatic individual is infectious
(days); Drec: Time to recover for M and H cases that do not require ICU
(days); DrecA: Time to recover (negativize PCR) for an IA (days); Dlag: Time for
H to require ICU (days); DrecICU: Time for HICU to recover in ICU (days);
PA: Probability of an infected patient to be asymptomatic; PH: Probability of a
symptomatic individual to require hospitalization; PICU: Probability of H to
require ICU; PF: Probability of HICU to die; DA: Day for asymptomatic isolation;
PAI: Probability to isolate an asymptomatic individual; PCR: Polymerase chain
reaction
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